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sense of true and false. This depends, on the side of the objects,
on their being combined or separated, so that he who thinks the separated
to be separated and the combined to be combined has the truth, while
he whose thought is in a state contrary to that of the objects is
in error. This being so, when is what is called truth or falsity present,
and when is it not? We must consider what we mean by these terms.
It is not because we think truly that you are pale, that you are pale,
but because you are pale we who say this have the truth. If, then,
some things are always combined and cannot be separated, and others
are always separated and cannot be combined, while others are capable
either of combination or of separation, 'being' is being combined
and one, and 'not being' is being not combined but more than one.
Regarding contingent facts, then, the same opinion or the same statement
comes to be false and true, and it is possible for it to be at one
time correct and at another erroneous; but regarding things that cannot
be otherwise opinions are not at one time true and at another false,
but the same opinions are always true or always false.
"But with regard to incomposites, what is being or not being, and
truth or falsity? A thing of this sort is not composite, so as to
'be' when it is compounded, and not to 'be' if it is separated, like
'that the wood is white' or 'that the diagonal is incommensurable';
nor will truth and falsity be still present in the same way as in
the previous cases. In fact, as truth is not the same in these cases,
so also being is not the same; but (a) truth or falsity is as follows--contact
and assertion are truth (assertion not being the same as affirmation),
and ignorance is non-contact. For it is not possible to be in error
regarding the question what a thing is, save in an accidental sense;
and the same holds good regarding non-composite substances (for it
is not possible to be in error about them). And they all exist actually,
not potentially; for otherwise they would have come to be and ceased
to be; but, as it is, being itself does not come to be (nor cease
to be); for if it had done so it would have had to come out of something.
About the things, then, which are essences and actualities, it is
not possible to be in error, but only to know them or not to know
them. But we do inquire what they are, viz. whether they are of such
and such a nature or not.
"(b) As regards the 'being' that answers to truth and the 'non-being'
that answers to falsity, in one case there is truth if the subject
and the attribute are really combined, and falsity if they are not
combined; in the other case, if the object is existent it exists in
a particular way, and if it does not exist in this way does not exist
at all. And truth means knowing these objects, and falsity does not
exist, nor error, but only ignorance-and not an ignorance which is
like blindness; for blindness is akin to a total absence of the faculty
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METAPHYSICS 114
of thinking.
"It is evident also that about unchangeable things there can be no
error in respect of time, if we assume them to be unchangeable. E.g.
if we suppose that the triangle does not change, we shall not suppose
that at one time its angles are equal to two right angles while at
another time they are not (for that would imply change). It is possible,
however, to suppose that one member of such a class has a certain
attribute and another has not; e.g. while we may suppose that no even
number is prime, we may suppose that some are and some are not. But
regarding a numerically single number not even this form of error
is possible; for we cannot in this case suppose that one instance
has an attribute and another has not, but whether our judgement be
true or false, it is implied that the fact is eternal.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
BOOK X
Part 1
"
"WE have said previously, in our distinction of the various meanings
of words, that 'one' has several meanings; the things that are directly
and of their own nature and not accidentally called one may be summarized
under four heads, though the word is used in more senses. (1) There
is the continuous, either in general, or especially that which is
continuous by nature and not by contact nor by being together; and
of these, that has more unity and is prior, whose movement is more
indivisible and simpler. (2) That which is a whole and has a certain
shape and form is one in a still higher degree; and especially if [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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